Two recent papers, Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 were both addressed to the same question: which is the 'best' theory of decision making under risk? The two papers shared a common concern: the appropriate trade-o between the descriptive accuracy of a theory and the predictive parsimony of that theory. In other respects, however, the two papers di ered markedly: rst in their treatment of the stochastic speci cation underlying the data generating process; second, and more importantly, in their interpretation of the question posed. This current paper tackles these two issues; rst, trying to resolve the issue of the correct stochastic speci cation; second, by clarifying what economists might mean by a`best' theory. The paper provides a general framework for answering such questions, and illustrates the application of this framework through two experiments aimed at answering the question:`which is the best theory of decision making under risk?'.
Introduction
Two recent papers, Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 , were both addressed to the same question: which is the`best' theory of decision making under risk? A second question that both addressed was: are any of the new generalisations of Expected Utility theory EU signi cantly better than EU in some appropriate sense? These are important questions: much theoretical e ort has been expended in trying to produce à better' story of decision making under risk than that apparently provided by EU. What has been the purpose of this e ort? Surely to improve the predictive power and descriptive validity of economics. These, of course, are competing objectives in general: other things being equal, the greater the predictive p o wer of a theory, the lower the descriptive validity I am grateful to a number of people whose thoughts and ideas have in uenced the development of this paper, particularly Bob Sugden and Enrica Carbone. of that theory. However, the purpose of`better' theory is to make other things not equal. Nevertheless, there generally and as it happens in the context of recent theories of decision making under risk, speci cally is the need to make some judgement of the appropriate trade-o between predictive power and descriptive validity: simply because if one theory was better in both predictive p o wer and descriptive ability than a second, the second would simply be discarded -i t w ould bedominated by the rst.
Unfortunately, discarding dominated theories does not lead -in the area of decision making under risk -to a uniquely dominating theory. To discriminate amongst the remaining theories one therefore needs to do three things:
1. Decide on an appropriate measure of the predictive success of any theory 2. Decide on an appropriate measure of the predictive p o wer of a theory 3. Decide on an appropriate way of trading-o the one against the other.
Selten Selten, 1991 gives one possible set of answers to these questions; two recent papers Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 give t wo i n terpretations of another. The purpose of this present paper is to try and shed light o n their relative merits, as well as providing a general framework for the analysis of such questions. Selten Selten, 1991 suggests:
1. that we measure the predictive success of a theory as the proportion of observations in some given data set consistent with that theory 2. that we measure the predictive power of the theory by the proportion of all possible observations on that same data set that are consistent with or predicted by that theory 3. that the appropriate trade-o is simply given by the di erence between these two proportions.
An illustration and application is given in Hey, 1998 . The main problem with this approach is that it leaves unresolved the key issue of the question of the meaning and interpretation of those observations inconsistent with the theory. Observations consistent with the theory are easy to interpret; but observations inconsistent with a theory are not so easy. A hardline approach requires us to interpret such observations as refutations of the theory -if we observe something inconsistent with a theory then that theory must be wrong. Unfortunately, if we proceed on this basis then we must conclude that all theories are wrong -since none predict all the observations on any given data set unless we restrict the data set enormously. Selten's approach recognises this and therefore does not give a theory a rating of minus in nity i f a n y inconsistent observations are noted; instead it treats all observations consistent with a theory the same positive weight and all observations inconsistent with a theory the same nite and negative weight. As Selten remarks: A hit is a hit and a miss is a miss". I am not sure that all would agree. For instance, suppose on a set of 10 Pairwise Choice questions, that the only responses consistent with Expected Utility theory are either all Left or all Right, then according to Selten both`LLLLLL-LLLL' and`RRRRRRRRRR' are consistent with EU, whilst anything else, for examplè LRRRRRRRRR' and`LRLRLRLRLR' are inconsistent with EU. However, many others would want to qualify this, saying that`LRRRRRRRRR' is somehow nearer to EU than is`LRLRLRLRLR'. Selten's measure does not allow such discrimination. In contrast the approach used by Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 does. A further disagreement might b e o ver Selten's suggested measure of the predictive p o wer of a theory -which is e ectively measuring what might be termed the parsimony of the theory. Is this really measured by the proportion of the possible observations on that same data set that are consistent with or predicted by that theory? As I shall argue, this depends upon what we are going to use our measure for -in other words, upon what we are going to use our analysis of the comparative ranking of the various theories for. Presumably this depends upon the application on which we are going to employ our`best' or`better' theories. It also depends upon the way that we are going to` t' our data to the various theories. As I shall show, the Selten measure of parsimony is very close to that used by Harless and Camerer -and this, in turn , is related to the way that they t the data to the theories. Let me look at these two lines of argument in detail, beginning with the use to which we are going to put our analysis.
This all depends on the way we`do' economics. If the economics we are`doing' is a straight exercise in theory then one makes some assumptions about the objective functions of the various economic agents and then one explores the implications. Whether the theorist assumes the decision makers are EU maximisers or whether they are assumed to have some other objective function is in some sense irrelevant to what the theorist is doing -since the theorist can beargued to be simply exploring the implications of certain assumptions. So for the purpose of the exercise of straight economic theory the question of which is the`best' theory of decision making under risk is irrelevant. But, of course, the exercise of straight theory is not the ultimate objective of economics -that must surely be the prediction of economic behaviour in a variety o f c o n texts. Here we use the theory that the theorists have developed. But the way we use it must depend upon the context: we make assumptions about the economic agents in the context under study and then employ the relevant theory. We might then investigate whether the assumptions are valid and whether we might employ alternative or stronger assumptions. Clearly, in general, the stronger assumptions that we make the stronger the predictions that we can make -though, at the same time it is equally clear that the stronger the assumptions we make the more likely it is that these assumptions are incorrect. So we collect some relevant information about the particular context in which we are interested. For example, when predicting demand, we assume a particular form for the consumers' utility functions, test whether that particular form appears to be consistent with the data, and if relevant, which it almost always is estimate any relevant parameters. Occasionally we may beable or may have to predict without any data at all, but such circumstances are unusual.
The context will determine what exactly it is that we are trying to predict -usually the aggregate behaviour of a group of individuals. However, given current economic method-ology, much of microeconomic theory is a story about individual behaviour, so one needs to decide how one is going to solve the aggregation problem. Is it better to think of the group as represented by some representative individual and hence predict on the basis of that representative individual? Or is it better to work on the assumption that di erent people within the group are di erent, try to discover how many people are of each possible type and predict on the basis of such a c haracterisation? In general the second of these two approaches will work better if indeed di erent people in the group are di erent, though it could be the case that aggregation over the individuals averages out the individual responses in such a w ay that the aggregate looks as if it is behaving as though all the individuals were of a particular type. But the conditions for this to beso are likely to bestrong -though much depends upon the context. Indeed there are contexts where the`representative agent' model must be doomed to failure unless all people are identical: for example, consider the problem of predicting a group's choice in a pairwise choice problem given information about the group's choices on earlier pairwise choice problems: the`representative agent' model must necessarily predict that all the group would choose one or the other choice, whereas if there is a distribution of types, some will choose one option, others will choose the other 1 . These two di erent interpretations lead to two di erent ways of assessing how well various models t the data. Of course, if the data set consists solely of aggregate data then there is no alternative but to t the models to the aggregate data. But if one has individual data then one can implement both approaches. Let us suppose that that is the case. One wants to see how well the various theories t the data. Occasionally a theory has no parameters -Expected Value Maximisation is an example of this -in which case there is no tting to bedone unless one needs to estimate some error parameter. With other theories parameters are involved -which means that the appropriate parameters need to bechosen in some fashion to t the theory to the data. Consider, as an example, the case of Expected Utility theory -which posits the maximisation of the expected value of 1 Unless, of course, there is some stochastic element i n b e h a viour. On this, see later.
some utility function. Unless one assumes that all agents are identical -and thus have the same utility function -then the`parameters' that need to be chosen are the parameters that de ne the utility functions over the relevant domain. This can be done in general -or it could bedone in a numberof ways speci cally for the data set under consideration. In order to explain what I mean by this, I need to give a speci c example. This can obviously be generalised but it is di cult to make my point in a general context.
Suppose for example that the data set at hand is the set of responses of a set of I individuals, i = 1 ; :::; I, to a series of J pairwise choice questions, j = 1 ; ::; J. Let the choice on question j by individual i be denoted by C ij and suppose this can take one of two v alues L j or R j . The data set, therefore, consists of the ixj matrix C = C ij ; i = 1 ; ::; I; j = 1 ; ::J.
Suppose further that individual i is an Expected Utility maximiser with utility function u i :, then the individual's responses to the J questions can be either described by the value of u i : at the set of outcomes involved in the J pairwise choice questions, or the actual set of responses by the individual on the J questions. Note that the former imply the latter but the converse is not true. One could therefore argue that the former characterisation is more primitive in some appropriate sense.
Suppose, in addition to the data, one has a set of theories each of which is an attempt to explain the data. How might one t the data to this set of theories? In general there are lots of ways of doing this -depending upon what restrictions, or assumptions, one imposes on the tting process. Clearly the fewer the restrictions one places on the tting process, the better that the t is likely to bebut the more`parameters' one needs to estimate. Thus, if one is going to penalise the`goodness of t' of the data to the set of theories for the number of`parameters' involved in the tting, those ts with fewer restrictions are going to bepenalised more heavily. One has a classic trade-o problem -which cannot beresolved in general but only in speci c cases.
2 Ways of Fitting the Data to the Set of Theories Let me list a partial set of the ways that one may` t' the data to the set of theories: S1. One can assume that the behaviour of all agents in the data set is consistent with one particular theory for example, Expected Utility theory and that they all have exactly the same preference function for example, in the case of Expected Utility theory, they all have the same Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
S2. One can assume that the behaviour of all agents in the data set is consistent with one particular theory for example, Expected Utility theory but that di erent agents potentially have di erent preference functions for example, in the case of EU theory, di erent agents potentially have di erent Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
S3. One can assume that di erent agents behave in accordance with di erent theories but that all those whose behavior is consistent with one particular theory share the same preference function relevant for that theory.
S4. One can assume that di erent agents behave in accordance with di erent theories and that agents whose behaviour is consistent with one particular theory may h a ve di ering preference functions relevant for that theory.
As an empirical fact, one quickly discovers that, however few restrictions one imposes on the tting method unless the restrictions are so few that the whole exercise becomes meaningless, one is unable to t the data exactly. What does one do? The obvious response -both for the economist and the econometrician -is to incorporate some story of errors into the tting process. In the context of the majority of the currently popular theories of decision making under risk, this`error' or noise term can very readily beinterpreted as genuine error on the part of the decision maker 2 . So one needs a story of these errors -or at least, a stochastic speci cation of the errors. As I shall demonstrate, the choice of error story may limit what one can do in terms of tting the data to the set of theories.
Error Speci cations
Let me concentrate on the two error stories proposed in the papers cited above: Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 . The rst of these papers simply assumes that there is a probability that the agent will make a mistake 3 on any pairwise choice question -and that this probability does not depend upon the nature of the pairwise choice question itself. One can go further, as Harless and Camerer Harless and Camerer, 1994 do and assume that is constant across all questions and indeed across all subjects, but this, of course, is not necessary. Again this depends upon how many restrictions one wishes to impose on the tting and upon the resulting e ect upon the goodness of t. But one could adopt any of the following:
CP1. There is a probability ij that subject i makes a mistake o n question j.
CP2. There is a probability i that subject i makes a mistake o n each question. CP3. There is a probability j that each subject makes a mistake on question j.
CP4. There is a probability that each subject makes a mistake o n each question. I ignore, for the time being, the issue of the identi ability of these various models, issues which could be very severe, particularly for the rst of these. Let me call these error speci cations, respectively, CP1, CP2, CP3 and CP4, where CP stands for Constant Probability.
The story proposed in Hey and Orme, 1994 is quite di erent. It goes back to the primitive of the preference functional V : implied by the theory: according to a theory with preferences given by V :, L j is preferred to R j if and only if V L j V R j , that is, if and only if V L j , V R j 0. However, to accommodate the empirical`fact' that agents make errors when choosing, Hey and Orme, 1994 interpret this as measurement error, suggesting that actual decisions are taken on the basis of whether V L j , V R j + 0 where is a measurement error. Obviously to make this operational one needs to specify the distribution of : it is fairly natural to specify its mean as being zero assuming no left or right bias in the agent's answers and possibly reasonably acceptable to assume that it has a normal distribution appealing to the Central Limit Theorem. The magnitude of the error variance 2 can therefore be taken as a measure of the magnitude of the error spread: the larger is the greater in general will bethe measurement error. Originally, Hey and Orme, 1994 
Describing True Preferences
In principle one can t any of the model speci cations combined with any of the error speci cations, though we see that sometimes this is not possible. Sometimes this is because of a type of identi cation problem. Partly this depends on how we intend to describe thè true' preferences, as de ned by the speci c preference functionals speci ed by the theory or theories in question. Let me return to that speci cation and illustrate with the case of Expected Utility theory. A particular EU preference function is de ned by the underlying Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. This might be describable by a particular functional form, for example, linear, or constant absolute risk averse, or constant relative risk averse or it might not. Of course, one can always t using a particular restricted functional form and the resulting saving in numbers of parameters to estimate may compensate for the worsening in the goodness of t. An alternative is to specify the function at all possible values of its argument -but there may well be an in nite number of these, most being unidenti able in any particular context. The best one can hope for, given that the pairwise choice questions must have been de ned over a particular set of nal outcomes, is to t the function at those outcomes. Suppose there are L of these nal outcomes, O l ; l = 1; :::; L. Then, at best, one can t the function by estimating the value of UO l at the L values. Let me call this speci cation of the underlying true preferences as the speci cation of the underlying True Values. Now, as I have remarked before, any set of L values for UO l implies a particular set of responses on the J questions -for example: L 1 L 2 R 3 ::::L J ; let me call this speci cation of the underlying true preferences as the speci cation of the underlying True Responses. Of course, these will be context speci c, but then so will be the set of underlying True Values. Note crucially that it does not follow that a di erent set of UO l implies a di erent set of responses on the J questions; that is, it does not follow that a di erent set of underlying True Values implies a di erent set of underlying True Responses: there may be several sets of UO l consistent with any given set of responses to the J questions. Of course, in the context of a particular set of questions, knowledge of the sets of UO l consistent with a given set of answers does not increase the amount o f k n o wledge gained from that data set; it just seems that it does 5 . In other words knowledge of the underlying True Values does not imply any extra knowledge -in a particular context -to knowing the underlying True Responses.
The above discussion has assumed that agents do not make mistakes. The evidence, however, would appear to contradict this. Of course, if agents do make mistakes then the way we specify their true preferences, combined with the way that we specify that they make mistakes, now has crucial and important signi cance. Consider a particular pairwise 5 An interesting question is whether one can use the information gained from a particular set of questions to predict choice in some choice problem outside the original data set. The answer is that one could if it were the case that all sets of underlying true values consistent with a given set of responses implied a particular response on the new choice problem. This is unlikely to be the case but if it were then the information about the new choice problem would also have been implicit in the original responses. choice question and suppose that an agent's true preference is for L j . Let aL j denote the set of parameter values of the underlying true preference functional which would give this particular preference. The CP errror speci cations would give that the probability of the agent choosing R j as ij irrespective of the actual value of the parameters within the set aL j . In contrast the WN error speci cations would imply that the probability of the agent choosing R j is dependent upon the particular value of the parameters within, of course, the set aL j . This implies that one can not use the WN error speci cation combined with underlying true preferences speci ed through the underlying True Responses -the reason simply being that, under the WN approach, the probability of making a mistake depends upon the underlying True Values and not just upon the underlying True Responses. However, and in contrast, one can use the CP error speci cations with the underlying true preferences speci ed through the underlying True Values -though the implication is, as I will demonstrate, that the data does not allow us to discriminate between all underlying true values consistent with the estimated underlying True Responses. The reason for this is that the CP error speci cation identi es rst the underlying True Responses and hence secondly but not uniquely the underlying True Values the lack of uniqueness stemming from the fact that there is a set of underlying True Values consistent with any given underlying True Responses.
Given that one cannot use the WN error speci cation with the underlying true preferences speci ed through the underlying True Responses, but that one can use the CP error speci cation with the underlying true preferences speci ed through the underlying True Values, one might well betempted to ask the question: why specify underlying true preferences through the underlying True Responses? Is there any advantage to doing so? The answer is: not really, at least when one understands what is the implication. There are some savings in computational e ort -but these simply re ect the nature of the problem. For example, when using the CP error speci cation with the underlying true preferences speci ed through the underlying True Values, one discovers that the likelihood function the thing we are trying to maximise -see later is a step function when graphed as a function of the underlying True Values. This simply re ects the fact that this error speci cation does not distinguish between all values of the underlying True Values -indeed it cannot distinguish between those which imply the same set of observed responses, but only between those which imply di erent observed responses. The fact that the likelihood function is a step function creates computational and econometric problems -but these simply re ect the essentially economic nature of the problem in the rst instance. Hence the di erence between specifying the underlying true preferences through the underlying True Values or through the underlying True Responses is essentially cosmetic. This eliminates one apparent di erence between the two papers under examination Harless and Camerer, 1994 and Orme, 1994 . I shall work with whichever is most convenient. However, the aggregation problem should bekept in mind: although several agents may have the same underlying True Responses they may w ell not have the same underlying True Values.
Notwithstanding these theoretical considerations it remains the case that these computational di culties are su ciently important to shape the nature of the test that I wish to undertake. Ideally, I want a data set on which I can implement several of the above speci cations. The problem is in implementing the CP error speci cation on data sets in which the numberof questions J is at all large. If one characterises the problem in terms of the underlying True Responses, there is an interesting problem in determining the composition of the set of responses consistent with any particular theory. I h a ve discussed this elsewhere Hey, 1998 and will not rehearse the arguments here. Su ce it to say that for J at all large the numberof possible responses 2 J is extremely large and the identi cation of the subset consistent with any given theory becomes a di cult task -particularly if the numberof underlying True Values is itself large. Of course, one can carry out the tting in the latter space, but if one is using the CP error speci cation this requires nding the maximum of a step function in a high-dimensioned space. And there is no guarantee that the function the likelihood function is everywhere concave in some appropriate sense 6 . 6 There is also the problem that one does not know where the next step is going to be, nor the width of it, which means that one could well miss the maximum. Indeed, with the algorithms currently in use -I h a ve elsewhere used a Simulated Annealing program written in GAUSS by E.G. Tsionas -there is no guarantee that the maximum will be found.
There are also complications if one wants to t across all subjects.
If one is to employ one of the speci cations in which agents are assumed to be di erent at least partially then one needs a reasonable amount of data for each subject. That is, one requires J to be reasonably large. This con icts with the requirement of the paragraph above. I compromised by carrying out an experiment with J = 15. I also carried out a complete ranking experiment. The next section gives the details. The idea was to t using both the CP error speci cation and the WN error speci cation so that the two could be compared.
The Experiments
I undertook two experiment s -a P airwise Choice experiment with J reasonably large to be precise J = 15 and a Complete Ranking experiment. The Complete Ranking experiment was linked to the Pairwise Choice experiment in a sense that will be described shortlybut they were otherwise carried out completely independently of each other. Both involved gambles involving three nal outcomes, which for the moment I shall refer to as x 1 ; x 2 and x 3 where these are indexed in such a way 7 that x 1 x 2 x 3 where denotes`less preferred than'. A speci c risky prospect is now described by the three numbers p 1 ; p 2 and p 3 where p i denotes the probability that the outcome will be x i i = 1 ; 2; 3. Note, however, that these three numbers must sum to unity -which means that any risky prospect can be described by just two of these three numbers. Take p 1 and p 3 -respectively the probability of the worst outcome and the probability of the best outcome. Now employ the expositional device known as the Marschak-Machina Triangle -with p 3 on the vertical axis and p 1 on the horizontal axis. See Figure 1 . Each point within the Triangle represents some risky prospect; each of those on one of the sides of the Triangle is a prospect involving just two o f the three outcomes; and those at the vertices of the Triangle are certainties involving just one of the three outcomes. The 11 prospects I used in the Complete Ranking experiment are the 11 points labelled a through k on this triangle. It will be noted that they all involve probabilities which are multiples of one-quarter. This was for a number of reasons, not least that, given the way we displayed the risky choices see the Appendix containing the instructions for the Complete Ranking experiment, the probabilities were immediately and obviously discernible. In the Pairwise Choice experiment I used the same 11 basic prospects and presented to the subjects all posssible pairs involving these 11 prospects subject to the proviso that neither prospect in the pair dominated in the rst-degree sense the other. There were 15 such pairs: speci cally ac; hc; hg; hi; fi; dc; dg; di; df;d j; de; ki; kj; ke and be. The reason why I omitted pairs in which one prospect dominated the other was that previous experimental evidence suggested that subjects virtually never chose the dominated prospect -in which case such questions would be uninformative. As it happened I observed surprisingly frequent violations of dominance on the Complete Ranking experiment. This suggests that subjects avoid violating dominance when dominance is obvious, but not necessarily otherwise -a view that has been gaining credence recently.
The Pairwise Choice experiment, with the 15 pairwise choices noted above, was carried out at EXEC 8 in York in 1995. The three outcomes were x 1 = $0, x 2 = $300 and x 3 = $500. I tried to recruit 250 subjects the publicity material mentioned this number but in the end I managed to recruit just 222 9 . To motivate the subjects, I used the following payment mechanism: after all 222 subjects had completed the experiment, all 222 were invited to a lecture room at a particular time. Each subject had a numbered cloakroom ticket identifying them; these tickets were put in a box and one selected at random. The subject with that number came to the front of the lecture theatre and drew at random one numberfrom the set of integers 1 through 15. That particular subject's earlier-stated preferrred choice on that particularly-numbered pairwise choice question was then played out for real -and the subject paid accordingly. As it happened the subject was paid $300 10 8 The Centre for Experimental Economics at the University o f Y ork 9 In a sense this number is irrelevant as long as one gets`enough' subjects -whatever that means as long as it does not a ect the choice made by the subjects.
10 For those interested in such things,the winning subject was one who had approached me at the beginning of the meeting -having found some other subject's cloakroom ticket and having the honesty to say so. Clearly there is a reward for honesty! -if the outcome had been $0 then the whole procedure would have been repeated from the beginning 11 . The Complete Ranking experiment w as carried out with the permission and very helpful cooperation of the conference organisers to whom I am most grateful at the Seventh World Congress of the Econometric Society in Tokyo, Japan, in 1995. In the participants' conference packs there was included a single sheet inviting them to participate in this experiment; this invitation is reproduced in the Appendix. Anyone wishing to participate in the experiment -which involved simply ranking in order of preference the 11 basic prospectshad to hand in their ranking at the beginning of a lecture session at which I g a ve one invited paper and Vince Crawford another. The experiment was played out at the end of the two lectures. Speci cally, one of the answers was picked at random; the person concerned came to the front of the lecture room; then two of the 11 prospects were drawn at random by this person -and the one highest in that person's previously-stated ranking was played out for real.
In this experiment, the outcomes were denominated in American dollars: x 1 = $ 0 ; x 2 = $200 and x 3 = $1000. Again the technique was deliberately to use large amounts of money and to pay o just one subject; my previous caveats apply 12 . It should also be noted that the middle outcome in the Complete Ranking experiment was chosen much closer to the worst outcome than in the Pairwise Choice experiment; this was because we had seriously misjudged the degree of risk aversion displayed by the subjects in the York experiment.
Analysing the Results
If I was to t all four models S1 through to S4 speci ed above in conjunction with all the eight error speci cations discussed above CP1 through to CP4 and WN1 through to WN4 I would have to t 32 di erent models to the data. Many of these can be discarded however. See Table 1 ; the following numbers refer to the entries in that table.
1. First, given the data set consisting of the results of the two experiments described above, the rows CP1 and WN1, involving the tting of a di erent error parameter either or for each subject and for each question, cannot be implemented -the parameters are not identi able, since questions were not repeated.
2. Harless and Camerer Harless and Camerer, 1994 would argue that we should also exclude rows CP2 and WN2 since "...allowing error rates to bechoice-dependent can lead to nonsensical results." page 1261.
3. I w ould argue that we should exclude column S1 since the notion that all subjects in our experiment had exactly identical tastes is manifestly absurd.
4. I w ould also go further and exclude column S3 on the argument that if we are prepared to accept that di erent agents may have di erent preference functionals it is then oddto argue that all those with the same functional should also have the same tastes within that functional.
5. I would eliminate the remainder of the WN4 row on the grounds that the empirical evidence obtained from the estimation of the WN2 row is that the error variances clearly vary considerably from subject to subject.
6. Finally I would eliminate column S4 combined with row CP4: if subjects really are as di erent as implied by S4 it is highly unlikely that they are identical in the way indicated by CP4.
As far as columns are concerned this leaves us with two -S2 and S4, e ectively the representative agent model and the varied agent model. A comparison of the tting for the two columns enables us to see which of these two stories appears to be the better. Generally we are left with speci cations A through E, as follows: Speci cation A: S2,CP2 All subjects have the same preference functional but di erent CP error parameters. This is particularly simple to t: for each subject we nd thè nearest' set of consistent responses consistent with a particular theory to the observed responses nearest in the sense of the smallest numberof mistakes between the consistent responses and the observed responses. We then add up the log-likelihoods across all subjects, theory by theory, correct them for degrees of freedom as described below and choose that preference functional for which the corrected log-likelihood is maximised.
Speci cation B: S4, CP2 Di erent subjects have di erent preference functionals and di erent CP error parameters. We follow the procedure described above, but then work subject by subject, rather than preference functional by preference functional: for each subject we nd the preference functional for which the corrected log-likelihood is maximised corrected in the manner described below and then aggregate the corrected log-likelihoods over all subjects. Because the correction procedure is di erent from that in Speci cation A see below there is no guarantee that this Speci cation does worse or better than Speci cation A.
Speci cation C : S2, CP4 This is the original Harless and Camerer speci cation: all subjects have the same preference functional and the CP error is constant across subjects. We calculate the log-likelihood across all subjects, preference functional by preference functional, correct them for degrees of freedom and then aggregate.
Speci cation D: S2,WN2 All subjects have the same preference functional but they have di erent WN error parameters. This is similar to Speci cation A except that we use the WN error speci cation. We work preference functional by preference functional, aggregating the maximised log-likelihoods across all subjects, correcting them for degrees of freedom and then choose that preference functional for which the corrected log-likelihood is maximised. Because the correction factor is the same as in Speci cation E, this is bound to do no better than Speci cation E. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how much worse it performs.
Speci cation E: S4, WN2 This is the original Hey and Orme speci cation: di erent subjects may have di erent preference functionals with di ering WN error parameters. We follow the procedure described above, but then work subject by subject, rather than preference functional by preference functional: for each subject we nd the preference functional for which the corrected log-likelihood is maximised corrected in the manner described below and then aggregate the corrected log-likelihoods over all subjects. There are some interesting estimation problems involved with the CP stories: as described in the original paper Harless and Camerer, 1994 the tting problem is one of nding the proportion of subjects in the sample with underlying true responses of each type consistent with any one theory. This is the case when the error parameter is assumed to be constant across both questions and subjects. In this case, the interpretation as to what is implied for any particular subject is that one is estimating the probabilities that the subject's underlying true responses are each of the allowable ones: the overall tted proportions are the weighted average of these probabilities, averaged over all observed responses. In contrast, when one assumes that the error parameter, i , v aries across subjects but not across questions then the maximum likelihood estimator of i is the minimised proportion of mistakes across all questions for that particular subject. So tting this story is equivalent to nding, for each subject, the response consistent with the appropriate theory closest to the subject's actual response -closest in the sense of the smallest number of errors implied by the actual response if that consistent response were indeed the subject's underlying true response. In this case the maximised log-likelihood is simply the maximum of ln j i 1 , i J ,j where J is the total numberof questions and j the numberof incorrect responses given the underlying true consistent response. This maximised likelihood is achieved when i = j = Jand takes the value j l n j + J , jlnJ , j , J l n J.
Correcting for Degrees of Freedom
It is clear that di erent speci cations involve di erent numbers of estimated parameters. Clearly also it is the case that the more parameters involved in the tting of a particular speci cation, the better that speci cation will t. Goodness of t is measured by the maximised log-likelihood for that speci cation. One therefore needs a way of`correcting' the maximised log-likelhood for the numberof parameters involved in the tting. This is a familiar problem in econometrics; there are a number of recommended solutions -none obviously superior to all others. I therefore simply adopt one of the more familiar ones -namely the Aikake Criterion
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. This involves maximising 2ln L , 2k=T where L i s the maximised likelihood, T the numberof observations and k the numberof parameters involved in the tting. Given that, in the comparisons I will be carrying out, the number of observations T will be constant, this is equivalent to maximising ln L , k. In other words, we simply correct the maximised log-likelihood by subtracting from it the number of parameters involved in its tting. Let me know turn to consideration of the numberof parameters involved in the tting of the various speci cations.
I need two bits of notation. Denote by M k the number of consistent responses under theory k. This obviously varies from theory to theory preference functional to preference functional and clearly also depends upon the speci c questions asked in the experiment.
Let me also denote by N k the numberof underlying true values required under theory k. Again this will vary across theories and will depend upon the speci c questions in the experiment. In the context of my two experiments -with just 3 outcomes -then N is zero for the Risk Neutral preference functional as there are no parameters involved with it, N is one for the Expected Utility functional -since the utility o f t wo of the three outcomes are normalised to zero and unity leaving just one utility v alue to be determined. As we shall see later, N is two for all the other theories under consideration -as the tting involves just one utility v alue as in Expected Utility therory and one other parameter. I can now specify the number of parameters involved with each speci cation and hence summarise my procedure for ranking and comparing the various sepci cations. Let LL ik denote the maximised log-likelihood function for subject i on theory k if the speci cation allows us to t subject by subject. If not, use LL k to denote the maximised log-likelihood across all subjects. Then it works as follows: Speci cation A: S2,CP2 All subjects have the same preference functional but di erent CP error parameters. Then, for each preference functional, we estimate the proportion of subjects with each of the M k true responses -thus giving us M k , 1 parameters to estimate because these M k proportions must sum to one -and, for each subject i, estimate that subject's error parameter i . We then choose that preference functional for which the following expression is maximised: max
Speci cation B: S4, CP2 Di erent subjects have di erent preference functionals and di erent CP error parameters. Because we are now e ectively tting subject by subject it is better if we t the N k true values. We t h us get as our maximised corrected log-likelihood:
Speci cation C : S2, CP4 This is the original Harless and Camerer speci cation: all subjects have the same preference functional and the CP error is constant across subjects
We are therefore tting M k ,1 proportions the nal one being determined by the fact that they must sum to unity and one error parameter. We thus get: max
Speci cation D: S2,WN2 All subjects have the same preference functional but they have di erent WN error parameters. So for each subject we need, for preference functional k, to t N k values and one error parameter i . We thus get: max
Speci cation E: S4, WN2 This is the original Hey and Orme speci cation: di erent subjects may have di erent preference functionals with di ering WN error parameters. The story is the same as Speci cation D, though the aggregation and maximisation are done in reversed orders. Thus the expression below is bound to be higher than that for Speci cation D above. We have:
Full and Overfull Correction
There is one caveat that needs to be made to the above discussion: it assumes that di erent subjects respond di erently. If, however, they do not not, then one could argue that the correction is excessive. If one has j subjects all with the same response, then under all speci cations other than Speci cation C, one could argue that having tted one of these j subjects then the other j ,1 are also tted by the same parameter values -one does need to repeat the correction. However, one does need to repeat the maximised log-likelihood as the other j , 1 subjects are genuine observations. This is the procedure followed in the tables below: under the`full correction' only one set of corrections is implemented for multiple repeat observations. The`overfull corrections' carry out a correction for each subject, irrespective of whether they have the same experimental responses as other subjects. I would argue that the Full Correction is the correct procedure.
CP Errors in the Complete Ranking Experiment
Given that Harless and Camerer introduced their error story in the context of Pairwise Choice experiments, and given that, to the best of my knowledge, this story has not been extended to the Complete Ranking context, I must make the extension myself. Whilst I have consulted with David Harless over this, I cannot be sure that this meets with his approval.
Consider a ranking of two objects, and suppose the true ranking is`12'. If the subject states this, there is no error; if he or she instead reports`21', then there is one error. Consider now three objects, and suppose`123' is the true ranking. Then`132' or`213' could be considered as one mistake -just one item in the wrong position -and`321' could be considered two mistakes. Such considerations lead to the following story. Suppose there are Z objects to rank and suppose the true ranking is x 1 x 2 :::x Z but the reported ranking is y 1 y 2 :::y Z then one could argue that the`numberof mistakes' made is P Z z=1 jx z , y z j=2. This is the measure I used. In keeping with the spirit of the CP approach I assumed that under the CP speci cations the probability of making any one of such mistakes was a constant independent of the context.
Preference Functionals Fitted
In addition to the models already discussed Risk Neutrality and Expected Utility I tted ve other functionals: Disppointment Aversion da; Prospective Reference pr; Rank dependent with the Power weighting function rp; Rank dependent with the Quiggin weighting function rq; and Weighted Utility wu. Details of these can be found in Hey, 1997 . All the generalisations of Expected Utility theory da, pr, rp, rq and wu involve one parameter extra to EU in the context of these experiments: da has Gul's parameter; pr has Viscusi's parameter; rp and rq have the weighting function's parameter; and wu has the w weighting parameter.
Results
Let me discuss the results speci cation by speci cation rst. Begin with Speci cation A in Table 2 . If one judges, as I have argued one should, on the basis of the Fully Corrected Log-Likelihood, then Prospective Reference theory pr emerges as the`best' functional on the Pairwise Choice experiment, and Rank dependent with the Quiggin weighting function rq on the Complete Ranking experiment. This echoes earlier ndings. Expected Utility theory does not do particularly well -as a Representative Agent model -and neither does Disappointment A v ersion theory especially in the Complete Ranking experiment.
Speci cation B is summarised in Table 3 . Details of the`best' model are given in Table 4 , which speci es the numberof subjects for whom a particular model was`best' in terms of the Corrected Log-Likelihood 14 . It may b e o f i n terest to note that Risk Neutrality comes best for 10 subjects on the PC experiment and best for 44 on the CR experiment. Corresponding gures for EU are 165 PC and 22 CR, whilst a top-level functional one 14 When k models tied for`best' under this criterion, each w as given a score of 1=k. of da, pr, rp , rq or wu came best for just 47 subjects on PC and 59 subjects on CR.
Recall there were 222 subjects on the PC experiment and 125 on the CR experiment. Prospective Reference theory pr did particularly well on the PC experiment and the Rank Dependent models on the CR experiment. It is interesting to note that Speci cation B does marginally worse than Speci cation A on the Pairwise Choice experiment, though marginally better on the Complete Ranking experiment.
Speci cation C is summarised in Table 5 . This is the original Harless and Camerer speci cation. It performs considerably worse than Speci cations A and B -indicating that the constant-across-all-subjects error hypothesis looks highly suspect -as one might imagine. For the record, EU does`best' for the PC experiment and Weighted Utility wu for the CR experiment. But one should not attach t o o m uch weight to these remarks.
Speci cation D is summarised in Table 6 . Remember that this is bound to do worse than Speci cation E -but the di erence is not too large. From Table 6 it can be seen that Prospective Reference theory pr does`best' on the PC data and Weighted Utility on the CR data.
Finally, speci cation E is summarised in Table 7 . The breakdown of`best' models is summarised in Table 8 . It can beseen that Risk Neutrality and Expected Utility theory do rather well.
An overall summary is provided in Table 9 . It is particularly clear from this that Speci cation C the original Harless and Camerer speci cation does rather badly. Thè best' speci cation appears to be that of Speci cation E -the original Hey and Orme speci cation. I suspect that this is the combined incidence of two e ect, rst a possibly better error speci cation 15 and partly and perhaps more importantly, because Speci cation C e m bodies the Representative Agent model which seems to be seriously misleading 16 . The 15 Though elsewhere Carbone and Hey, 1997 I provide direct evidence to compare the WN error specication with the CP error speci cation, from which it is not clear that either can be regarded as generally superior. 16 It may b e i n teresting to`translate' the maximised log-likelihoods into probabilities for individual subjects on individual questions. On the Pairwise Choice experiment the LL gure of -625 for Speci cation E is equivalent to a probability o n a verage of 0.829 on each question for each subject of observing what was observed given the tted model. In contrast, the LL gure of -992 for Speci cation C i s equivalent t o a probability of 0.742. evidence of this paper must surely bethat people are di erent.
Conclusions
Two methods of assessing and comparing theories have been referred to in this paper: the Selten method and the Harless Camerer Hey Orme HCHO method. Both penalise thè goodness of t' 17 of theories through some measure of the parsimony of the theory. The Selten penalisation turns out to bee ectively the same 18 as that of HCHO in the context of the Harless and Camerer method of tting the data to the theories Speci cation C. This penalisation is e ectively the number of parameters involved with the tting of the speci cation -and is familiar to econometricians. In other speci cations it needs to be modi ed appropriately. But it is not this that distinguishes Selten from HCHO. Rather it is in the measurement of`goodness of t' or predictive success: Selten A miss is a miss and a hit is a hit" counts all observations consistent with a theory as successes and all those inconsistent as failures. In contrast HCHO measure how bad misses are -near misses being better for a theory than distant misses. This requires a stochastic speci cation which, of course, Selten's does not and allows the use of the Maximised Log-Likelihood as the measure of predictive success. The stochastic speci cation di ers between Constant Probability and White Noise. A peripheral question answered in this paper concerns which of the two is empirically best, but the major nding is that one can view both Harless and Camerer and Hey and Orme as two attempts to answer the same question within the same basic framework. This paper has made clear what that framework is.
Fundamentally the issue at the heart of this paper boils down to the question of the best corrected t -which is a essentially empirical question. As it happens, with the data set that we have, it appears to bethe case that the Representative Agent model performs particularly badly -with the conclusion being that it is better to treat di erent people as di erent. Doing otherwise leads to worse predictions -notwithstanding the improved 17 Here measured by the Maximised Log-Likelihood. 18 Compare the penalisation used in this paper with that in Hey, 1998. parsimony.
And nally, as far as the`Best' theory of decision making under risk is concerned, our analysis tells us that we should not discard Expected Utility theory. Nor should we discard all the many new theories -some are`best' for some subjects -though there are some theories which look of increasingly minor interest. 
